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INTRODUCTION 
In the next few minutes I would like t o  tell you about  the why, what, and how of 
C R M  a t  Flight Safety International (FS1)--that is, the philosophy behind our program, 
the content of our program, and some insight regarding how we deliver t ha t  t o  the pilot. 
I will touch on a few of the concepts tha t  are part of our program. This  will include a 
view of statistics we call the 'Safety Window," the concept of situational awareness, and 
an approach to  training that  we call the Cockpit Management Concept (CMC). 
For those not familiar with Flight Safety, it may be useful t o  know a little about us. 
Flight Safety is in the training business. It  is the only thing we do. One distinguishing 
characteristic of the pilot training we d o  is t ha t  the pilots we train d o  not work for us-- 
we work for them. 
FSI was founded in 1951 by A. L. Uettschi, a Pan Am pilot. We currently provide 
initial and recurrent training to over 20,000 professional pilots a year. There are over 
four hundred full-time, flight, ground, and simulator instructors employed by the 
company. We operate a fleet of seventy-five flight simulators which are dispersed among 
twenty-five Learning Centers in North America and two in Europe. Our growing fleet 
covers the entire gamut of corporate and airline equipment including MD-80, B-737, EL 
727, DC-10, and A-300 aircraft. Accordingly, each simulator represents the state-of-the- 
a r t  a t  the time of manufacture. Levels of equipment include Phase 11, Phase I, visual, 
non-visual, and training devices. 
FSI has two divisions which provide support for pilot training operations. 
Communication Systems Division (CSD), located in Houston, Texas, which develops and 
produces training support materials, including manuals, slides, and video, as well as 
providing a focal point for course development. Our Simulation Systems Division (SSD) 
in Tulsa, Oklahoma designs and builds training equipment including flight simulators, 
cockpit system simulators, and part-task trainers. 
The  topic I have been asked to  speak on relates t o  C R M  training for 91, 135 and 
corporate operators. It  is often assumed tha t  there are major differences between these 
segments of aviation and airline and military operations. However, these differences are 
primarily organizational rather than operational. Hence, we do  not distinguish in our 
C R M  training between Part  135 operators, Par t  91 operators, or  Par t  121 operators. 
T h a t  is, we believe when an airplane is being vectored t o  final approach in critical 
weather, or in any other condition, the needs of a flight crew don't  vary according to  the 
style of their operation or the kind of organization they fly for. Our CRM training also 
does not distinguish between training for captains, co-pilots, second officers, or any other 
crew members. 
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Flexibility is a key factor in CRM training a t  Flight Safety. We have a large 
operation that  provides in-house training, sets standards, and develops programs on the 
basis of need. Training programs vary from one airline to another. At FSI we train 
crews for over 1800 corporations plus airlines, government agencies, and the military. 
Each has a different view of how to train, how to  fly an airplane, and how to address 
CRM. CRM training a t  FSI is designed with a flexible delivery approach that  allows it 
to  be easily adapted to various needs. 
The philosophy behind the cockpit resource management training we do a t  FSI 
begins with what we call the '5afety Window." The Safety Window represents a 
statistical view of accidents and accident causes over the past number of years. The 
Safety Window is defined as a block of airspace centered around a runway extending 
from the ground t o  2,000 feet AGL. The window begins a t  or about a final approach fix 
and ends a t  the approximate conclusion of the final segment of take-off climb. It 
includes the approach, landing, taxi, take-off, and climb phases of flight. 
An analysis of the Safety Window yields the following observations: 
o The window represents only 7 percent of total flight time 
(based on an average stage length of 75 minutes). 
o More than 80 percent of accidents and incidents involv- 
ing professional pilots occur in the window. 
o Most of these events are generic. That is they are ac- 
cidents that have as a root cause some sort of crew 
management error rather than- a mechanical failure. 
o Crew workload intensity peaks within the window. 
If this window of risk or exposure is so important, what can we learn from it? 
Should one leave the window if something goes wrong? Or, should you stay in the 
window? There is evidence to indicate that  either choice might be appropriate, 
depending on conditions. What criteria should one use to  make that  choice? 
This led us to the concept of 'Situational Awarenes~.'~ It is the heart of the cockpit 
resource management training that  we do a t  Flight Safety. Situational awareness is an  
accurate perception of the factors and conditions that  affect an aircraft and a flight crew 
during a specific period of time. In more simple terms, it is knowing what goes on around 
you. 
This is a back-to-basics concept. At the start  of primary training, pilots are taught 
the need to  "think ahead of the aircraft1'--situational awareness. We find that  our flight 
instructors routinely have to remind highly-experienced professional pilots of this need to 
think ahead. 
It is important to note that situational awareness has a very direct relationship to  
safety. It  is a simple one. T h e  more a pilot knows about what is going on around him, 
the safer he will be, and the less he knows about what goes on around him, the less safe 
he will be. 
The  best illustration of this relationship is the safety record of drunk drivers. This is 
a n  area of growing national concern. Characteristics common to  drunk drivers are--an 
unfounded sense of well-being, impaired hand-eye coordination, dulled senses, and slowed 
reaction time. Drunk drivers have more accidents because they have less control over 
their situation--they don't know what is going on around them. In other words, they 
have low situational awareness. 
I t  is important t o  stress the contribution tha t  situational awareness makes toward 
safety. Because safety is the operational goal and there is such a strong relationship 
between the  two, we believe tha t  the goal of any pilot training program should be to  
enable a crew t o  reach a higher level of situational awareness in operating their aircraft. 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS O F  SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
We have identified five elements tha t  contribute t o  situational awareness: I )  
experience and training; 2) physical flying skills; 3) spatial orientation; 4) cockpit 
management skills; and 5) health and attitude. Each is discussed below. 
Ezperience and Training 
We describe experience as a mental file or experience file tha t  every pilot uses to assess 
conditions and make decisions throughout the progress of a flight. Study of human 
performance indicates tha t  when an  individual is put  under a great deal of pressure, the 
tendency is. for t ha t  individual t o  revert to  a previously established pattern of behavior. 
Therefore, if you can instill within an individual's experience file the desired response to  
stimuli, there is more likelihood of a safe and desirable outcome. 
Experience ties directly t o  training. They cannot be separated. Many situations 
have the potential to  occur in flight, but  are unlikely to  d o  so. The  training process is 
used to  expand an experience file by creating those events. For example, a lifetime's 
worth of experience can be compressed into a very short period of time in a simulator. 
An excellent illustration of this relationship between training and experience is the loss 
of a n  engine on takeoff. Very few pilots have or will ever actually experience one. Yet 
most professional pilots have developed the  control skills necessary to  safely fly an  
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airplane through a takeoff following an  engine failure a t  or above V . 
T h e  transfer of skills developed in training to  an  individual's experience file works. 
T h e  proof lies in crew response to  an  actual failure. It  is not unusual for a crew reporting 
on the loss of a n  engine on take-off t o  say, "the airplane flew just like the simulator.ll 
T h e  key here is not that  the airplane flew like the simulator, although tha t  is surely the 
case, but  rather t ha t  the pilot flew the airplane just like he flew the simulator. The  
transition from training to  the experience file works. This  is why training and experience 
are  a n  important contributor t o  situational awareness. 
Physical Flying SkiUe 
Physical flying skills contribute to situational awareness. The role of the pilot is 
changing from that of a control manipulator to that of an information processor. 
However, it must be remembered that pilots still have to fly airplanes. Control skills are 
essential and contribute to  situational awareness. 
Spatial Orientation 
This is knowing where the aircraft is in space and where you want it to go in relation to 
navigational aids, other aircraft, altitude, terrain, attitude, airports, runways. 
Cockpit Management Skills 
Cockpit management skills are the thread that binds this model together. We have 
identified ten specific skill areas that play a role in cockpit management and their effect 
on situational awareness. They are the vehicle by which a pilot can attain, maintain, and 
re-achieve (if lost) situational awareness. These skill areas will be addressed in more 
detail later in this paper. 
Health and Attitude 
Both contribute t o ,  situational awareness. Physical and emotional health affect an 
individual's ability to clearly see conditions and events and to  interpret their meaning. 
Personal attitude also has an effect on safety. Safety does not just happen. One must 
work to make it happen. This equates to a sense of professionalism. Together, health and 
attitude are important contributors to situational awareness. 
DYNAMICS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
With this overview of what situational awareness is in place, it's worthwhile to 
examine its dynamics. The heart of this is a model of individual versus group situational 
awareness. A captain and a copilot can each have their own view of what is happening, 
each with his or her level of situational awareness. However, the key to safety lies 
within the cumulative effect of what these pilots know-that is, the group's level of 
situational awareness. Contrary to what one might expect, group situational awareness 
does not appear to be the sum total of the levels of situational awareness of the crew 
members. Instead, group situational awareness is limited to the level of situational 
awareness of the pilot-in-command. 
Consider this illustration: a twin-engine jet with a twu-pilot crew is in flight, 
straight and level a t  250 knots. The aircraft is in the clouds, 500 feet below the peak of a 
mountain which is 2 miles ahead. The captain is flying the airplane. The aircraft and its 
crew and passengers are in a dangerous position. 
The captain and copilot each have a sense of the situation--that is, a level of 
situational awareness. For the sake of this illustration, let us assume that the captain 
does not know the mountain is dead-ahead. By the equation relating safety and 
situational awareness, the captain has low situational awareness. He is not safe. 
In this example, the copilot knows exactly where the aircraft is in relation to  the 
mountain. He can be said to have high situational awareness. By the equation, he 
should be safe. 
What is going to  happen to  the aircraft? Clearly if the copilot cannot raise the 
captain's situational awareness, he will fly into the mountain. Despite the copilot's high 
situational awareness, the crew is unsafe. 
This example illustrates how the captain can limit group situational awareness. A 
look a t  accident history provides a case in point. Just a few short years ago, a DG8 ran 
out of fuel during a visual approach to  Portland International Airport. The flight had 
experienced a gear problem. Concerned about the possibility of a post-crash fire, the 
captain elected to  delay landing in order t o  burn-off as much fuel as possible. Too much 
fuel was burned. The aircraft lost power and crashed in a residential neighborhood short 
of the runway. Weather was not a factor. 
During the events leading up to  the accident, both the first officer and the flight 
engineer repeatedly expressed concern about the fuel-state of the aircraft t o  the captain. 
He did not heed their advice. The captain had low situational awareness. The other 
crewmembers had high situational awareness, and tried to raise the situational awareness 
of the captain. They were unable to do so. The aircraft crashed. 
The E737 that crashed on take-off from Washington National Airport in 1983 
provides another example where a captain's low situational awareness could not be 
raised by other crewmembers, and the aircraft crashed. 
Some of the cockpit management skills that  come into play include communicating 
skills and managing people. These illustrations also draw attention t o  the concepts of 
command and leadership. 
So far, this paper has examined situational awareness from several perspectives. The 
concept has been defined. The definition was expanded upon by identifying the five 
elements that  contribute to  situational awareness. Finally, the dynamics of situational 
awareness are described in the model of individual versus group situational awareness. 
The next step in this process is to  put the idea of situational awareness into a practical 
format that  a pilot can use. 
THE ERROR CHAIN 
The dynamics of situational awareness are embraced by the concept of the 'krror 
chain." It is rarely the case that  accidents result from one clearly-defined catastrophic 
error. Instead, accidents tend to  result from a series of errors or events. This so-called 
chain-of-events is called an error-chain. The cliche that  "no chain is any stronger than 
its weakest linkff might hold here. That is, if a pilot or a crew could be taught t o  break 
one or more of the links in an  error-chain, then in theory, the accident might not 
happen. This  may appear t o  be too simplistic, however, after applying the concept t o  
selected accidents, there is reason to  believe tha t  i t  works. In fact, by breaking only one 
of the links in an  error-chain, it is possible t o  stop the progress of a flight towards an 
accident. 
How then, may a pilot identify links in an error-chain so tha t  the  accident tha t  
might happen, is avoided? We have identified ten clues to  the loss of situational 
awareness. They are the keys to  finding the  links in an  error-chain. 
1) Ambiguity: when two or more independent sources of in- 
formation d o  not agree. 
2) Fization or Preoccupation: when attention of the crew is 
focused on one item, event or  condition to  the exclusion 
of all other activity in the cockpit. 
3) Empty Feeling or Confusion: when a pilot or crew is un- 
sure of the s tate  of the aircraft or its condition. 
4) Violating Minimums: when minimums are intentionally 
violated or consideration is given to  doing so. 
5 )  Undocumented Procedures: when consideration is given 
to  using an  undocumented procedure or when an un- 
documented procedure is, in fact, used. 
6 )  Nobody Flying the Aircraft 
7) Nobody Looking Out the Window 
8) Failure to Meet Targets: when parameters or expecta- 
tions of events are not met. 
9) Unresolved Discrepancies: when confusion, questions, or 
statements of concern are  not resolved. 
10) Departure from Standard Operating Procedure: when 
standard operating procedure fails t o  be used at the ap- 
propriate time. 
Any one of these can be a clue to  finding a link in an error-chain. 
This  is not a black and white situation. Pilot judgement and experience is needed t o  
put  this t o  use. For example, while the clues are intended to identify lost situational 
awareness, there are instances when they could result from high situational awareness. 
For example, it may be appropriate to use an undocumented procedure in the event of a 
failure for which no procedure has been developed. 
The goal of training programs taught by FSI is t o  allow a crew to  reach a higher 
level of situational awareness in the aircraft. Four of the five elements that  contribute to  
situational awareness--experience/training, physical flying skills, spatial orientation, 
health and attitude--have traditionally been a part of professional aviation training 
programs. 
The fifth element, cockpit management, has not been an integral part of training 
programs. It has been taught by exception, by instructors who orient briefings and 
training programs toward CRM type skills. Discussion of cockpit management skills has 
frequently been a part of "hangar flying." 
In order to  allow a crew to  train to the highest level of situational awareness 
possible, it is necessary to have in place a training program that  will allow them to  focus 
attention on those areas that  will contribute to that  goal. The addition of cockpit 
management courseware allows this to happen. 
COCKPIT MANAGEMENT TRAINING ELEMENTS 
The cockpit management courseware used by Flight Safety addresses ten specific 
skill areas. Before reviewing them, it is first necessary to  provide a reference point by 
establishing a definition of cockpit management. We define it as ' the use and 
coordination of all resources available to the crew t o  achieve the established god  of 
safety, efficiency, and comfort of flight." The skills used to  help achieve this goal are: 
1) Checklist Use and Function 
2) Management of Resources 
3) Communication Skills 
4) Recognition and Management of Distractions 
5) Flight Planning and Progress Monitoring 
6) Judgement and Decision-Making 
7) Managing People (includes personality awareness, leadership and command) 
8) Pattern Recognition 
9) Stress Management 
10) Workload Assessment and Time Management 
This training is provided as part of a Cockpit Managemed Concept of training 
(CMC). There are four elements that  make up the Cockpit Management Concept of 
training. The first is courseware for cockpit management training. 
The second is Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). The key to  LOFT is the 
development of simulator scenarios that  allow the crew to  build experience identifying 
links of an error-chain. Teaching crews to  find the links of an error-chain without the use 
of simulators and carefully designed LOFT scenarios is not likely to succeed. It has to  be 
trained into the experience file so that in the real world it can be turned into practice. 
The third is crew self-critique. This involves the use of video cameras to record 
simulator sessions for use in debriefing. Our application is to permit crews to view 
portions of their own performance and to critique themselves. The learning potential is 
extraordinary. 
The last element is instructor critique. Nothing works, in our view, without the 
instructor tying it together. 
Each of these elements of CMC have been designed in a stand-alone or component 
format. That is, a student need not do all four in sequence to make the program work. 
Each section is designed so that it can be done independently of the other. They can be 
used in whole or in part. CMC training can be included in any training program. It can 
also be used as the format for a stand-alone course. This allows flexibility to meet 
various organizational needs. It also permits a course to be tailored to the specific needs 
of the student. 
Flexibility is particularly important to us a t  Flight Safety because of the nature of 
our relationship with the crews we train. The pilots that we train do not work for Flight 
Safety. We work for them. This is different from the situation s t  most airlines and 
military training organizations. 
Our cockpit management courseware is delivered by an instructor who then uses a 
specially-designed computer-interactive learning system to permit students to role-play, 
using the skills discussed by the instructor. As an option to instructor-led training or as 
a self-study vehicle, the interactive system can be used very effectively by itself. 
We have chosen to include CRM training in four sections. One section of material 
will be taught a t  each subsequent training interval. The purpose of this sectional 
approach is to introduce this new material in a fashion that will dlow it to be absorbed 
into a pilot's experience file, ready to be used effectively when needed. 
For those who wish to address CRM training a t  one sitting, we will establish a 
three-day seminar late this year. Seminar training will be supported by LOFT training 
and crew self-critique during normal simulator training sessions. 
